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GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN PROMOTION:  
THE CASE OF SPANISH LABOR MARKET 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis that a glass ceiling phenomenon exists in the Spanish labor 
market -that as women rise in the professional hierarchy, they face increasing obstacles for 
promotion. Taking data from the Spanish Survey on Quality of Life at Work (ECVT) for 
2001, a number of indicators were selected for promotion: “number of promotions”, 
“supervision levels”, “number of people supervised” and “net wage”. 
The relative gaps were calculated for each of the intervals (categories) for these variables, 
in order of size, starting with the smallest. These measure the percentage by which 
women’s participation would have to increase in order to reach the level that would exist if 
there were no discrimination (the latter being calculated, in line with the Oaxaca 
decomposition, by evaluating women’s endowments in the model estimated for men, for 
whom it is assumed there is no gender discrimination). In order to calculate these relative 
gaps, for each of the indicators one model was estimated for women and one for men. The 
ordered probit model was used to calculate the probabilities (or theoretic frequencies) for 
the presence of women/men at each of the intervals considered. The results indicated that, 
in all cases, the relative gap tends to increase as the intervals rise. This might indicate the 
presence of a glass ceiling problem. 
The paper has four sections. The first covers the existing literature on the glass ceiling 
phenomenon. The second examines the main characteristics of the data and shows some 
preliminary results. The third presents the ordered probit model used to estimate the 
women’s and men’s equations. The fourth shows the main results. The closing section 
gives some conclusions.  
Keywords: Glass ceiling, gender discrimination, labor market 
JEL Classification:  J71, J24, K31  
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1. Introduction and background 
 
Of the various social movements of the twentieth century, perhaps none can be compared to 
the women’s movement in developed countries because it has spread to all areas of public 
life. According to data from the European Commission (1997), women account for all the 
growth in the working population in the European Union over the last twenty years. In the 
case of Spain, although the figure for employed women is about half that for men (39% and 
62% respectively), about two million women have entered the labor market. 
However, the well-established presence of women in the world of employment and their 
improved qualifications are not reflected in their careers as there is a marked imbalance in 
the professional development of the two sexes. Gender discrimination at work still exists 
and is especially clear in jobs involving a high level of responsibility and social esteem, 
only 3% of which are held by women. 
Supply theories on the low numbers of women in management positions have mostly been 
based on human capital theory (Becker, 1964; Blau and Ferber, 1992), explaining the 
different levels of promotion for men and women by the lower educational level of women 
as well as their more limited professional experience because many voluntarily give up 
work to bring up their families and tend to be less committed to their jobs than men. 
Moreover, it used to be stated that women did not want stressful, competitive jobs, which 
also meant that they were less likely to be promoted than men.  Other writers suggested that 
the gender-based socialization that takes place from childhood leads to the development of 
management characteristics in men but not in women (Henning and Jardim, 1977). Finally, 
it was maintained that lifestyle choices – with priority being given to the husband’s career 
and to the family in preference to employment – also explained the differences between 
men and women at work (Markham, 1987). The neo-classical economists used the human 
capital theory to show that supply factors explain the low percentage of women in 
management positions, higher wages for men and greater responsibility and career 
possibilities for men. These supply theories have undoubtedly made an important 
contribution to our understanding of these differences but the facts show that they cannot 
fully explain the differences in promotion. 
Longitudinal studies have been carried out (Olson and Frieze, 1987; Wallace, 1989) 
analyzing, for example, the professional careers of men and women with the same training 
(graduates with MBA). These have found that, in spite of having the same qualifications, 
the same professional ambitions, the same devotion to their jobs and assuming that at the 
start of their careers they all had similar status and salaries, the careers developed 
differently. The men were promoted faster and ended up at higher levels and with better 
pay than the women. The only possible explanation for these differences was, and is, what 
has been called the “glass ceiling”. 
This metaphor has been used by the media1, public institutions and academic publications 
(Morrison et al,2 1987; Segerman-Peck, 1991; Powell, 1991; Davidson and Cooper, 1992) 
                                                 
1 The term glass ceiling was popularized in a 1986 Wall Street Journal article describing the invisible barriers faced by 
women as they approach the top of the corporate hierarchy. 
2 One of the first authors to use this metaphor stated that the glass ceiling is “a transparent barrier that keeps women from 
rising above a certain level in corporations... It applies to women as a group who are kept from advancing higher because 
they are women.” 
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to explain that there is a barrier of procedures, structures, power relations, beliefs, etc. that 
make it difficult for women to reach management positions. Qualified women can see 
further capabilities beyond this glass ceiling but cannot reach them because of the invisible 
barrier. 
If we take the term literally, the glass ceiling implies the existence of a barrier that prevents 
women from moving upwards. Below it, women progress and are promoted, but above it 
promotion is impossible. However, most of the literature takes it to mean a situation in 
which women find themselves at an increasing disadvantage with regard to men as they rise 
in the organizational hierarchy (Baxter and Wright, 2000)3. Such authors consider that a 
specific pattern of disadvantage can be seen at the higher levels of the organizational 
hierarchy. The most literal sense considers that the glass ceiling indicates the level beyond 
which women can go no further, whereas the second meaning is broader and does not try to 
identify the glass ceiling at a specific level but only within the highest levels of the 
hierarchy. 
This latter meaning is the most widely-used and is the one we shall use in our analysis. 
However, whatever the definition used, it is important to point out that our analysis aims to 
distinguish between discrimination for vertical promotion and other types of discrimination, 
and to determine whether the intensity of this specific type of discrimination is greater for 
management positions and positions of responsibility. If so, legislation aiming to resolve 
gender discrimination in the labor market would have to vary depending on the type and 
cause of discrimination. 
The doctrine has presented a number of theories analyzing the glass ceiling phenomenon, 
but the mechanisms behind this effect are as yet unknown. Many of the theories lead to 
contradictory results, and few empirical studies have been carried out to quantify and 
explain the glass ceiling. 
The existing literature uses different methods to measure the glass ceiling. An initial group 
of studies analyses the phenomenon by focusing on a specific profession or sector, whereas 
another type of article studies the problem from a more general point of view, taking the 
whole working population of a city or country as the sample. The former have the 
advantage of more detailed information on the sample so their results are less likely to 
show deviation but cannot be applied to the whole population. In addition, as stated by 
Paulson (2002), the glass ceiling noted by women is not uniform throughout the labor 
market. This makes it essential to carry out studies allowing the glass ceiling to be 
measured in different professions in order to help design legislation to try to resolve the 
problem.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Britton and Williams (2000) criticize the definition of the glass ceiling given by Baxter and Wright because they 
consider it to be a barrier not only to positions at a higher hierarchical level but also to greater prestige and/or income. 
Also because the definition ignores the possibility that the glass ceiling might also exist at lower levels of organizations. 
With regard to the first of these criticisms, the authors accept that they could use the concept in the broader sense, but this 
would make it necessary to describe the different glass ceilings with adjectives, and they claim that with their definition 
they are referring to a single dimension of the problem only. Regarding the second criticism, they consider their definition 
does not imply that the glass ceiling for promotions to management cannot also exist at lower management levels. 
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AUTHOR AND 
YEAR 
SECTOR SAMPLE MAIN RESULTS 
Gibelman, M. 
(2000) 
NGOs (Non-
governmental 
organizations) 
850 NGOs 
carrying out 
humanitarian 
services in the 
USA, of which 74 
were selected 
• Although a mainly female profession in which 
almost 2/3 are women, 22% of the men held 
management positions, and only 11% of 
women. The glass ceiling exists. 
• In similar posts in management and with the 
same educational level, the women earned less 
than the men. 
Mc Dowell, J. 
Singell, L and 
Zilliak, J.  (1999) 
American academic 
economists  
Panel data from 
the American 
Economic 
Association 
• There is a glass ceiling in its broadest sense. 
The average female economist is 36% less 
likely to be promoted from assistant to 
associate professor, and 9% less likely to be 
promoted from associate to full professor than a 
man. 
• Other possible explanations: 
-Female academics dedicate more time to 
teaching and service than their male 
counterparts 
- Differences in research orientation between 
women and  men 
Tang, J. (1997) American scientists 
and engineers 
1989 Survey of 
Natural and 
Social Scientists 
and Engineers 
• There is a glass ceiling. Asian men were 56% 
less likely to occupy a management position 
than a white man in 1980. 
• Asian women are 70% less likely to hold a 
management position. 
• The results provide support for the double 
penalty thesis. 
Jones, D. and 
Makepeace, G. 
(1996) 
British financial sector Personnel data 
from a large 
financial 
company 
• Women have to meet more stringent criteria 
than men for promotion. 
• However, lack of experience is more important 
quantitatively than the glass ceiling in 
preventing the preferment of women 
- the proportion of women managers rises 
from 3% to 20% if the work experience is 
made comparable to that of men. 
- the promotion of women managers rises 
from 1% to 3% if women are treated  in the 
same way as men. 
 
 
Limited conclusions can be drawn from these studies because the sectors studied are too 
specific. Although there is unanimous agreement that it is more difficult for women to 
reach management positions, no-one agrees on the cause of this gender difference. Some 
writers consider the main explanation to be different levels of experience whereas others 
lay the blame more on barriers in structures, procedures, etc., that is, the glass ceiling. 
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AUTHOR    DATA METHODOLOGY MAIN RESULTS 
Albrecht, J. 
Bjorklund, A. 
Vroman, S. 
(2003) 
LINDA data for 1994 
SSW (Statistics Sweden 
for research purposes) 
for 1992 
SLLS (Swedish Level of 
Living Surveys) for 
1991 
Quantile regression 
decomposition 
• There is a significant glass ceiling in Sweden (large 
gap between men and women at the top of wage 
distribution) 
• Adding field of education, sector and industry reduces 
the gender gap, but these can be considered 
endogenous variables. 
• Adding occupation, the gender gap at the top of 
distribution is substantially reduced, but this variable 
might be another way of showing the glass ceiling 
effect 
Hultin, M. (2003) SLLS (Swedish Level of 
Living Survey) from 
1991 
Cox regression models • Results indicate that men who work in typically female 
occupations have substantially better internal 
promotion prospects than their similarly qualified 
counterparts. This confirms the glass escalator 
hypothesis. 
• Results indicate that men and women have equal 
internal career chances in male-dominated 
occupations. Hence there is no glass ceiling in 
male occupations. 
Gang.I, Landon-
Lane, J. and Yun 
M.S. (2002) 
Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), from 
the USA. 
German Socio-
Economic Panel 
(GSEOP), from 
Germany 
First order Markov 
Chain 
Bayesian Methods 
• Results indicate strong evidence of a glass ceiling in 
Germany. Females enjoy greater income mobility in 
the lower and middle income classes but males have 
significantly higher income mobility for the higher 
initial income classes. 
• There is no evidence of the glass ceiling in United 
States. Women have a significantly lower conditional 
probability of moving to a higher income class for all 
income groupings. Therefore, there is vertical 
discrimination against women in all classes. 
De la Rica, S. and  
Felgueroso, F. 
(2001) 
EES 95 (Spanish 
Earnings Structure 
Survey) 
Job cells 
Oaxaca decomposition 
of the gender gap 
• Results indicate that males are more likely to be the 
higher job category (the human capital of men and 
women being equal). Therefore, there is a glass ceiling 
unless there are unobservable differences in 
productivity between sex. 
• Results indicate that between ¼ and 1/3 of the gender 
gap is explained by differences in human capital 
characteristics, so differences in returns account for 
around 70% of the total wage differential. 
Baxter, J. and 
Wright, E. (2000) 
  
Two cross sectional 
surveys 
- United States 
(1980-1991) 
- Australia  
      (1986 and 1993) 
- Sweden 
      (1980 and 1995) 
Logistic regressions • In all three countries, there is a gender gap in authority, 
but in the United States there is a little evidence for 
large, systematic glass ceiling effects. The 
disadvantages for women in acquiring authority are 
greatest at the lower levels of managerial hierarchy. 
• In Sweden and Australia there may be glass ceiling 
effects but they are located more around the middle or 
managerial hierarchies than at the top 
Groot, W.  Van 
den Brink, H. 
(1996) 
British Household Panel 
Survey from 1991 and 
1992 
Probit models • The data ratify the dead–end jobs hypothesis and not 
the glass ceiling effect. 
• Women are less frequently in jobs that offer promotion 
opportunities than male workers. However, once 
workers are in jobs that offer promotion possibilities, 
there are no significant differences by gender. 
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Few conclusions can be drawn from these studies because of the different samples and 
methodologies used. The data corroborate the existence of the glass ceiling in Germany, 
Sweden and Spain but the phenomenon is not clear in the United States where greater 
vertical discrimination is noted. It seems that American women find it more difficult to gain 
promotion than men but the obstacles do not increase as they rise in the occupational 
hierarchy. 
There is no unanimity on why a glass ceiling exists. Some authors consider the main reason 
to be that women have few possibilities of promotion in male-dominated jobs, or that 
entrepreneurs evaluate men’s and women’s qualifications differently. Others claim the 
opposite, that in male-dominated jobs the possibilities of promotion are the same for both 
sexes and that, in most cases, the differences are determined by the more limited experience 
of women. All the studies seem to confirm that, as variables quantifying human capital such 
as studies, type of studies, experience, type of experience are introduced, the glass ceiling 
tends to disappear. However, it would be necessary to consider whether such variables 
explain the process of discrimination or are endogenous to it. 
 
 
2. The data and some preliminary results 
 
The data 
The “Survey on Quality of Life at Work” (Encuesta de la Calidad de Vida en el Trabajo, 
ECVT) is carried out annually by the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. This 
study takes the 2001 survey. The geographical area covered is the whole of Spain (with the 
exception of the Spanish enclaves in Africa of Ceuta and Melilla). The population is limited 
to the working population aged 16 and over and living in family homes. The sample covers 
a total of 6,020 working individuals. 
The aim of the survey is to study quality of life at work for workers, and to obtain objective 
information on real situations in the working environment and subjective information in the 
form of the personal perceptions of workers on their working conditions and industrial 
relations. 
The questionnaire has four parts: family environment (married or cohabiting, working 
situation of spouse or partner, number of children, etc.); working situation (employee, self-
employed; occupation, sector, working history, processes of integration and promotion, 
etc.); quality of life (job satisfaction, etc.); and socio-economic data (sex, age, educational 
level, size of town of residence, etc.)   
This study takes the sub-group of wage-earning workers. This reduces the sample to 4,664 
wage-earners, of whom 1,785 are women and 2,879 men. 
 
Main results on some promotion variables and markers 
Table 1 gives four sets of summarized data broken down by sex. The first two give data on 
a number of the individuals’ job characteristics. The third gives data on individuals’ 
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personal characteristics. The fourth gives some basic results on the professional promotion 
indicators to be used in this study. 
The first set of data in Table 1 shows that on average women have less work experience 
and seniority than men. These results may reflect the fact that full incorporation of women 
in the Spanish labor market is relatively recent, so the limited presence of women in the 
50+ age bracket reduces the average experience/seniority for total employed women.  
Data on temporary employment point to a well-known feature of the Spanish labor market: 
the percentage of workers on temporary contracts is very high, especially for women, and 
this ties in with the hypothesis that women (on average) occupy lower-quality, less stable 
jobs than men. 
Part-time jobs are practically the exclusive domain of women (21.9%). As shown lower 
down in this table, this may reflect the fact that the majority of working women have to 
make employment outside the home compatible with running a home, and this limits the 
possibilities of professional promotion for women having family responsibilities. To a large 
extent, the fact that part-time employment is almost exclusively taken up by women 
explains why their average working week is shorter than that for men. 
It is interesting to note that levels of job satisfaction are similar for women (7.72) and men 
(7.83) on a scale of 10. 
When asked if they usually stay on at work after their stipulated working hours, 35.53% of 
women and 29.18% of men reply “Never”. This might, once again, indicate that women are 
on average less committed to their companies because they have to make their jobs 
compatible with their domestic activities. 
The second set of figures shows that more women than men work in the public sector (in 
which working conditions are more stable and there are greater facilities for maternity 
leave, etc.) and in small and medium companies. This may tie in with the fact that there is a 
greater percentage of men than women in companies with trade union representatives. 
Regarding the positions held in companies (management, supervision, employees), there is 
a much lower percentage of women managers or supervisors than men. This breakdown of 
positions into just three categories does not show whether the percentage of women falls as 
they rise in the hierarchy (however, we are dealing with this fact later through the variable 
“number of people supervised”). 
It is also interesting to note, although the opposite is sometimes suggested, that women (on 
average) receive more days training than men. 
Finally, two indicators are given showing considerable wage differences between men and 
women. 
The third set of figures (personal characteristics) shows that the average age of employed 
women is lower than that of men. As stated above, this is because the later incorporation of 
women into the labor market is associated with the changing generations. 
Regarding educational levels, the percentage of employed women with university studies is 
much higher than that for employed men. This may be related to the fact that the labor force 
participation rate is much greater for women with university qualifications. However, 
taking data from the “Spanish Survey on Labor Force” (Encuesta sobre la Población 
Activa) for the 16+ population, the percentage of women with university qualifications is 
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still greater in the <39 age group, although the difference is not as great as in the previous 
case. 
Regarding married/coupled people, the percentage of married, employed women is much 
lower than that of married, employed men. This is in line with the fact that some women 
stop paid employment when they marry and have children (especially in the generations 
now aged 50+), whereas this phenomenon is practically non-existent for men. The next 
figure on the table corroborates this. In the case of employed women, 84.38% of their 
partners work, whereas only 31.74% of the partners of employed men work. 
Finally, it is fairly clear that the percentage of working women who are married/with 
partner and who are also largely responsible for domestic activities is much higher than that 
for employed men who are married or cohabit. 
The fourth and last set of figures in the table shows the average values for a set of 
indicators regarding professional promotion: the number of promotions received in the 
current company; the possibility of promotion in the current company; levels of supervision 
beneath the worker; the number of people supervised directly or indirectly; and the net 
wage. 
For these four indicators, women stand at significantly lower levels than men. In the case of 
promotions, the women-men gap is much more important for the “number of promotions in 
the company” (39.5%) than for “possibility of promotion” (88.1%). This might indicate that 
on average women are over-optimistic about their chances of promotion. It might, however, 
also point to a gradual reduction in the limitation of promotion possibilities for women as a 
result, amongst other things, of women’s better qualifications and greater professional 
experience today. 
The “number of people supervised” can be used to indicate the position of the individual in 
the company or the professional hierarchy. In this case, the gender gap is at its lowest, 
26.9%. This might indicate, as will be shown in detail below, that the presence of women is 
very limited at the highest levels of the professional hierarchy.   
With respect to average net wages, and in line with the values for the above-mentioned 
indicators, women’s wages stand at 74.4% of men’s. 
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Table 1. Summary of some of the main variables of the survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women Men Women-men gap
bor experience (years) Average 15.61 20.56 75.9
(Median) (14) (20)
iority (years) Average 7.78 10.12 76.8
(Median) (4) (6)
mporary employment (time-limited contract) Percentage (1) 34.73% 27.93% 124.4
rt time workers Percentage (1) 21.91% 3.90% 561.6
erage workweek hours Average 36.04 41.69 86.4
(Median) (40) (40)
isfaction (2) Average 7.72 7.83 98.5
(Median) (7) (7)
orking day prolongation: never Percentage (1) 35.53% 29.18% 121.8
or Percentage (1) 26.95% 19.97% 134.9
panies < 50 Percentage (1) 61.27% 56.17% 109.1
bour union representative Percentage (1) 52.16% 58.53% 89.1
nager Percentage (1) 2.15% 3.72% 57.8
ervisor Percentage (1) 7.40% 13.96% 53.0
mployee Percentage (1) 90.45% 82.33% 109.9
raining (days per year) Average 13.53 10.21 132.5
(Median) (5) (4)
et wage <  932 € Percentage (1) 37.48% 10.01% 374.4
et wage > 1803 € Percentage (1) 2.58% 7.70% 33.5
e Average 36.58 38.98 93.8
(Median) (36) (38)
Primary school or less Percentage (1) 14.63% 22.45% 65.2
ndary or high school Percentage (1) 55.61% 57.57% 96.6
ege graduates Percentage (1) 29.04% 19.32% 150.3
arried/couple Percentage (1) 50.59% 66.41% 76.2
The spouse works (out household) Percentage (1) 84.38% 31.74% 265.8
ependent children Percentage (1) 48.46% 54.53% 88.9
ponsible for domestic work (3) Percentage (1) 95.56% 39.38% 242.7
/he does most domestic work (3) Percentage (1) 51.50% 1.88% 2735.0
ber of promotions (within the organization) Average 0.23 0.58 39.5
(Median) (0) (0)
ility of promotion (within the organization) (4) Average 2.14 2.43 88.1
(Median) (2) (2)
vels of supervision (beneath the worker) Average 0.25 0.53 46.8
(Median) (0) (0)
 many people she/he supervises (5) Average 1.27 4.71 26.9
 (Median) (0) (0)
 wage Average 802.1 € 1,078.3 € 74.4
(Median) (751.3 €) (1051.8 €)
La
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(1) Percentages over the total amount of women and the total amount of men, respectively 
(2) Satisfaction at work, in a range that goes from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied) 
(3) It refers to the sub-group of married/stable couple 
(4) Answer to the question: "with your training, have you possibilities of being promoted in your 
company/organization?, in a range that goes from 1 (no possibilities) to 5 (many possibilities) 
(5) How many people she/he supervises (directly or indirectly) 
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The percentage of women as we rise in the professional hierarchy 
Remember that the main purpose of this study is to contrast the hypothesis that, as we rise 
in the professional hierarchy, the percentage of women decreases. That is why Figures 1 to 
5 show how the percentage of women4 changes as the values (or intervals) for the five 
above-mentioned promotion indicators rise. 
Figure 1.a refers to the “number of promotions in the company”. It shows that the 
percentage of women (the women participation) tends to drop as the number of promotions 
considered increases. Note, too, that the last column shows the percentage of women over 
total individuals in the sample (38.5%) and that if the percentages for the different intervals 
are compared with this, only at the interval for “no promotions” is the percentage of women 
higher than this global percentage.  
However, the “number of promotions” is largely (and positively) determined by the years 
worked in the company. This is why it is of interest to offer an adjusted value for this 
variable that takes into account the seniority. This can be drawn from the “promotion 
index”, PI, which is the quotient between “number of promotions” and years worked in the 
company. As shown in figure 1.b, in this case the percentage of women only decreases in 
the first four intervals, not in the next three, and these last three percentages are below the 
global percentage of women (the right-hand column). 
Figure 2 shows “possibility of promotion”. Here the percentage of women decreases from a 
very high value for “no possibilities” down to “reasonable possibilities”. In the highest 
category, that of “many possibilities”, the percentage of women rises, but the percentage 
(36.9%) is lower than the global percentage of women (37.7%). 
In this preliminary analysis of the variables for “number of promotions” and “possibility of 
promotion”, the percentage of women is always much higher on the left and then tends to 
decrease, but a clearly decreasing profile is not noted as the intervals rise. 
This is not the case for Figures 3, 4 and 5 for “levels of supervision”, “number of people 
supervised” and “net wage”. These show a clearly decreasing profile as the intervals rise.  
Take into account that these last three indicators show the level occupied by the worker in 
the professional hierarchy, while the number of promotions indicates the rate of change 
between levels. In any case, we are analyzing all of them in the following econometric 
analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
4 This refers to the percentage of women over the total for women and men for each interval. That is, if we take the ith 
interval, 
100
ºº
º ×+ ii
i
mennwomenn
womenn     . 
We are calling to this percentage “women participation”. 
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Figure 1. Participation (percentage) of women at each interval of number of promotions 
and index of promotions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Participation of women at each interval of possibility of promotion 
 
 
 
 
º 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Participation of women at each interval of levels of supervision  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Percentage of women in each interval of "nº of promotion"
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0 1 2 3 4 or 5 6 or more % women
(total)
Number of promotions 
b) Percentage of women in each interval of "promotion index"
43.0%
25.8%
19.0%
16.7%
26.1%
32.1% 30.9%
37.7%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
0 0.01-0.1 0.11-0.2 0.21-0.3 0.31-0.4 0.41-0.5 0.51-3 % women
(to tal)
Intervals of promotion index 
46.6%
35.2%
32.5%
29.9%
36.9% 38.2%
0%
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35%
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45%
50%
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possibilities
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Figure 4. Participation of women at each interval of number of people supervised 
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Figure 5. Participation of women at each interval of net wage 
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3. The Econometric Model 
 
Our main aim is to estimate to what extent the differences observed between men and 
women in the promotion variables in the Spanish ECVT Survey on Quality of Life at Work 
(wages, number of promotions, levels of supervision, number of workers supervised) can 
be explained by differences in men’s and women’s endowments and by gender 
discrimination in the Spanish labor market. 
We are not trying to provide an explanation for promotion (the main variables or factors 
determining promotions). Our aim is less ambitious: to quantify how much gender 
discrimination affects promotion. 
To achieve our aim, we shall follow the pseudo Oaxaca decomposition methodology. We 
shall assume that differences between men and women that are not explained by their 
different endowments are due to discrimination. The degree of discrimination is therefore 
obtained as a residual, as the part that is not explained by endowments. This methodology 
requires quantification and consideration of all the endowments that may be behind a 
worker’s promotion. We have therefore included in our model all the possible variables 
relating to a worker’s endowments that can be obtained from the above-mentioned survey, 
bearing in mind that the list is not exhaustive (certain characteristics of a worker are 
impossible to observe and therefore are not included in our model).5 That is, the results 
obtained as residuals should not be considered as relating strictly to discrimination but 
rather to inequality or differences in the labor market. We can only talk of discrimination 
assuming that such endowments that cannot be observed or that are not included in our 
model are not significantly different between men and women. In other words, we may be 
overestimating the degree or intensity of gender discrimination in promotion. 
It should also be borne in mind that our results cannot be extrapolated to discrimination 
between men and women in a broad sense. Since the ECVT survey does not give 
information for men and women as a whole in the Spanish economy (irrespective of 
whether they are working or not, are employed or unemployed) but only of the workers 
who were in employment at the time of the interview, our results can only be applied to this 
segment of the working population.6
This section summarizes the econometric model and the pseudo Oaxaca decomposition 
methodology we use to estimate the degree of gender discrimination at each of the levels of 
promotion in order to test the glass ceiling hypothesis. 
 
 
The ordered probit model 
                                                 
5 For example, an individual’s innate skill at organising teams or tasks, heading projects or bearing responsibility for the 
management or organisation of work. Perhaps, if we had sufficient information to track an individual’s complete 
professional career over the years, we could use panel data methodology to estimate these unobservable, heterogeneous 
effects in individuals. Unfortunately, this methodology cannot be applied to the information given in the ECVT survey 
used here. 
6 If we had information on all men and women (whether working or employed or not), we could use econometric 
methodologies involving selection sampling in order to apply our result to the general population, as it would allow us to 
estimate each individual’s reasons for working or not or for being employed or unemployed. 
 14
As stated above, our aim is to estimate to what extent the differences observed between 
men and women in the promotion variables can be explained by differences in their 
endowments and to what extent they are due to gender discrimination in the Spanish labour 
market. 
In addition, in order to test the glass ceiling hypothesis, we shall try to obtain an estimate of 
gender discrimination at each of the promotion levels or scales (Do discrimination, 
inequality and barriers to promotion increase for women as their skill level rises?). In this 
way, we have to use different promotion levels or scales, that is, category variables 
expressing an order. 
We consider the most appropriate economic model for our purposes to be the Ordered 
Probit Model (see Greene, 2003, pp. 736-740, and Wooldridge, 2002, pp.504-509). This 
allows us to estimate an individual’s probability of being in each of the categories or 
promotion levels because of his endowments, considering that the categories are in some 
type of order, e.g. 0 - no promotions; 1 - middle level; 2 - senior management).  
The ordered probit (or logit) model is a special case of a multinomial-choice dependent 
variable model where this dependent variable is inherently ordered, and for that reason, 
although the outcome is discrete (skill or promotion level), the multinomial probit (or logit) 
model would fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable7. 
Let y be an ordered response taking on the values {0,1,2,…,J} for some known integer J. 
The ordered probit model for y (conditional on explanatory variables x) can be derived 
from a latent variable model. Assume that a latent unobserved variable y* is determined by 
the following linear regression model: 
 ey += β'* x ,            e |x ~ Normal (0,1) [1] 
where β is a K×1 and x the independent or explanatory variables (without a constant)8. Let 
α1<α2< ··· <αJ  be unknown cut points (which must be estimated) and let us define the 
observed ordered response variable y as 
y = 0 if y* ≤ α1
y = 1 if α1< y* ≤ α2 [2] 
··· 
y = J if y* > αJ
Given the standard normal assumption for e, it is straightforward to derive the conditional 
distribution of y given x; we simply compute each response probability: 
P(y = 0 | x)= P(y* ≤ α1 | x)= P(x'β + e ≤ α1 | x)= Φ(α1-x'β) 
P(y = 1 | x)= P(α1< y* ≤ α2 | x)= Φ(α2-x'β) - Φ(α1-x'β) 
···  [3] 
P(y = J-1 | x)= P(αJ-1< y* ≤ αJ | x)= Φ(αJ -x'β) - Φ(αJ-1 - x'β) 
P(y = J | x)= P( y* > αJ | x)= 1-Φ(αJ -x'β)  
                                                 
7 In a similar way, if the skill or promotion levels are coded as 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4, then linear regression would treat the 
difference between a 4 and a 3 the same as that between a 3 and a 2, whereas in fact they are only a ranking. 
8 The probit model comes from the normal assumption for e. The ordered logit model is formed using the logit function 
for the distribution of e. We use the probit model only because economists tend to favour the assumption of normality. 
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Where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Note that if the ordered 
variable y has a quantitative meaning, its expected value is determined by 
 E(y | x)=α0 P(y = 0 | x) + α 1 P(y = 1 | x) + ··· + α J P(y = J | x) . [4]     
The parameters α and β can be estimated by maximum likelihood9. The results of this 
estimation require some comments, since neither the β estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted as the partial effect of the independent variables on the response probability, nor 
can the traditional statistics for measuring the goodness of the fit be applied. 
For the ordered probit model and a continuous xk independent variable: 
( )β')|0( 1 xx −φ−=∂
=∂ αβ k
kx
yP  
( ) ( )[ ]ββ '')|( 1 xxx −φ−−φ−=∂=∂ − jjkkx
jyP ααβ ,    0<j<J [5] 
( )β')|( xx −φ=∂
=∂
Jk
kx
JyP αβ  
where φ(·) is the standard normal density. Thus, while the direction of the effect of xk on the 
probabilities P(y = 0 | x) and P(y = J | x) is unambiguously determined by the sign of βk 
(since φ(z)>0 for all z), the sign of βk does not always determine the direction of the effect 
for the intermediate outcomes, 1,2, …, J-1. In any case, the magnitude of these partial 
effects depends not only on βk but on x'β and α through φ(·).  Note, however, that when 
interpreting the estimated coefficients, we can look at the significance of the coefficient.10  
Problems also arise for evaluating the model’s overall adjustment. As stated above, the 
purpose of the model is to predict the response probability in each category given a set of 
endowments, and the result gives an estimated probability for each individual of being in 
each category. In order to obtain an overall measurement of adjustment it would be 
necessary to calculate the error but, since we are not observing the individual’s probability, 
but whether or not he falls within a given category, any error cannot be directly observed. 
There are three widely-used alternative methods for measuring adjustment –the 
Expectation-Prediction table, the pseudo R-squared and the likelihood ratio statistic11. 
                                                 
9  For each i, the log-likelihood function is li(α,β)=1[yi=0] log[Φ(α1-xi'β)] + 1[yi=1] log[Φ(α2-xi'β) - Φ(α1-xi'β)] + ··· + 
1[yi=J] log[1-Φ(αJ-xi'β)], where 1[·] is the indicator function (equal to 1 if the expression inside the indicator function is 
true; and equal to 0 if that expression is false). We use the Eviews 4.0 (Quantitative Micro Software, 2001) statistical 
package to estimate the ordered probit models using the quadratic hill climbing optimisation algorithm and computing the 
robust standard errors and covariance using the quasi-maximum likelihood (or pseudo-ML) standard errors (Hubert/White 
method): , where ( ) 11 ˆ'ˆˆˆˆvar −−=β HggHQML gˆ and 1ˆ −H are the gradient and Hessian of the log likelihood evaluated at 
the maximum likelihood estimates. These standard errors are robust to certain mis-specifications of the underlying 
distribution of y (but not to heteroskedasticity).   
10 Since the most realistic estimators are not only asymptotically consistent and efficient but also asymptotically normal, 
the analogous can be applied to test t to find its significance. 
11 The Expectation-Prediction Table classifies observations on the basis of the predicted response. Our paper presents two 
measures of the global fit of the regression. The first one measures the difference between the observed count and the 
number of observations where the probability of that response is highest; and the second one measures the difference 
between the actual number of individuals reporting the value, and the sum of all of the individual probabilities for that 
value. The pseudo R-squared proposed by McFadden (1974) suggests the measure 1-LUR/L0, where LUR is the log-
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Finally, we have to remember that ordered probit models are inconsistent for β when the 
error term e in the latent model [1] is heteroskedastic or non-normal, because the functional 
form in the response probability is no longer the one in [3]. 
 
Discrimination as a residual: The pseudo Oaxaca decomposition in the ordered probit 
model  
Having explained the econometric model, we shall now briefly describe the methodology 
used to obtain the pseudo Oaxaca decomposition.  
For each of the dependent variables representing promotion, we shall estimate an ordered 
probit model with the sub-sample of men and another model with the sub-sample of 
women. (The same explanatory variables are used in both estimations). These shall be 
called the men’s model and the women’s model respectively. This will allow us to estimate 
the mean probability for men and for women of being in each of the promotion categories. 
We shall therefore calculate the mean probability of each man of being in each of the 
categories in line with the model estimated for them by applying [3]: 
( ) ( )∑ === m
i
i
M
iM
M
M ym
y xx |0P1|0P  
( ) ( )∑ === m
i
i
M
iM
M
M ym
y xx |1P1|1P  
···  [6] 
( ) ( )∑ === m
i
i
M
iM
M
M Jym
Jy xx |P1|P  
where m is the total number of men; the subindex M indicates male mean probability in 
each of the J+1 categories; and the superindex M indicates that we are using the parameters 
estimated in the male ordered probit model. 
Mean probability for women will be calculated in a similar way by using the sub-sample of 
women and the parameters estimated in the women’s model: 
( ) ( )∑ === f
i
i
F
iF
F
F yf
y xx |0P1|0P  
( ) ( )∑ === f
i
i
F
iF
F
F yf
y xx |1P1|1P  
···  [7] 
( ) ( )∑ === f
i
i
F
iF
F
F Jyf
Jy xx |P1|P  
                                                                                                                                                    
likelihood function for the estimated model (unrestricted model) and L0 is the log-likelihood function in the model without 
x as independent variables (restricted model). Finally, to test the global fit of the model (global significance) we use the 
likelihood ratio statistic 2(LUR-L0) which has an asymptotic χ2k distribution under the null hypothesis (this is analogous to 
the usual F statistic in Ordinary Less Squared analysis of a linear model). 
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where f is the total number of women; the subindex F indicates female mean probability in 
each of the J categories; and the superindex F indicates that we are using the parameters 
estimated in the female ordered probit model. 
If we combine the models estimated for men and women with the different sub-samples we 
can estimate, firstly, the mean probability for men of being in each category if their 
endowments are evaluated in the same way as those of women, that is, using the women’s 
model: 
( ) ( )∑ === m
i
i
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M ym
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i
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iM
F
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y xx |1P1|1P  
···  [8] 
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We can also calculate the mean probability for women of being in each category if their 
endowments are evaluated in the same way as those of men, that is, using the men’s model: 
( ) ( )∑ === f
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These  probabilities therefore indicate the mean probability for women of being in each 
of the J+1 categories if their endowments are evaluated in the same way as those of men. 
They can therefore be interpreted as theoretical probabilities without gender discrimination. 
That is, the differences between men’s probabilities ( ) and women’s probabilities 
without discrimination ( ) should be explained exclusively by the differences between 
men’s and women’s average endowments.  
M
FP
M
MP
M
FP
If we take these theoretical probabilities without discrimination, it is possible to build a 
pseudo Oaxaca decomposition showing what percentage of the difference observed 
between the probabilities of being in each category for men ( ) and for women ( ) can 
be explained by differences in the average endowments of men and women and what 
percentage is due to other factors that we can identify with inequality or gender 
discrimination: 
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A possible index of the degree of discrimination for women in each category could be the 
relative difference or relative gap defined as: 
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The discrimination index defined in [11] shows or can be interpreted as the percentage at 
which the probability of women of being in each category should increase in order for the 
real probability or frequency observed to be equal to the theoretical frequency if there were 
no discrimination [9]. 
This discrimination index can be used to test the glass ceiling hypothesis, according to 
which gender discrimination increases as the individual rises in the scale of promotion 
 
4. Main results of the econometric analysis of the glass ceiling 
 
In this section we summarize the results of our analysis on gender discrimination in 
promotion, obtained according to the pseudo Oaxaca decomposition showed in section 3, 
and using data from the ECVT.  
First, we have estimated two ordered probit models for the sub-samples of women and men, 
for each of the four dependent/explained variables related to promotion: 
- The number of promotions in the current company 
- The levels of supervision beneath the worker 
- The number of people supervised directly or indirectly 
- The weekly net wage. 
Indeed, for each of these four explained variables we have estimated two models (female 
and male) with the same regressors in both, although we have used a different set of 
regressors for each explained variables. In particular, for each explained variable we have 
selected as a regressors all the variables that were statistically significant, either in the 
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women’s model or in the men’s model12. Among this explanatory variables we can point 
up:  
- Age 
- Married/stable couple 
- Number of children 
- Private or public sector 
- Part time or full time workers 
- Temporary employment 
- Average workweek hours 
- Seniority 
- Size of the company 
- Working day prolongation: always 
- She/he has a job with lower level than that one corresponding to her/his formation 
- Monotonous job 
- She/he has now more studies than at the beginning of he/his working live 
- Training in the company 
- Number of times unemployed 
- Education attainment 
- Region of residence  
- Activity sector (of the company) 
- Occupation (of the worker) 
The results of the estimation of the eight models are in the appendix. We can make a brief 
commentary of these results. In general, the goodness-of-fit of the women’ models are 
better than men’s. Except for the model for wages (where we get the best fit), in the rest of 
promotion variables the models fail quite a lot when predicting in which interval (of 
promotion or hierarchical) is each worker (both men and women). In despite of this, all 
models replicate quite well the observed frequencies. Among the more statistically 
significant variables we have seniority, activity sector, occupation and average workweek 
hours  
We also might point up that for all explanatory variables there are important differences 
among the models corresponding to women and men (according to the log likelihood ratio-
test for sex). Among the explanatory variables for which we find biggest differences 
between sex we can point up the size of the company, education attainment and region of 
residence (they are globally significant for men but not so for women). 
Second, starting from the results obtained in these models we have estimated the average 
probabilities (the frequencies) for women and men of being in each category (evaluating 
the endowments of each worker in each model according to the equations 6 and 9); those 
probabilities are show in the tables of the appendix. These estimated average probabilities 
are going to be used in the following analysis of gender discrimination for each category or 
promotion level.  
                                                 
12 Besides the variable “number of children”, that in spite of not been significant in any model, we decided to maintain it 
in all of them, because the theory state this is an important explanatory variable 
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Indeed, figures 5 to 8 and tables 2 to 9 show the results, concerning glass ceiling, obtained 
from the econometric analysis of the four promotion’s indicators used in this study. More 
specifically, the following are given for each of these explained variables: 
- A table with the frequencies13 and participations for the different categories 
(intervals) 
- A figure representing the theoretical results in graphic form, with and without 
discrimination, of women’s participation at the different categories considered  
- A table with the Oaxaca decomposition for the frequencies. 
• Table 2 shows women’s frequencies and women’s participations for “number of 
promotions”. Real frequencies were obtained directly from the sub-sample of women used 
in the econometric analysis, and theoretical frequencies were obtained from the results of 
the ordered probit models. These then gave the real and theoretical participation. 
Concerning the theoretical values, a distinction must be made between:  
- The columns for theoretical frequency/participation, which give the values obtained 
when women’s endowments are evaluated using the coefficients estimated in the 
women’s equation (the estimated ordered probit model for the sub-sample of 
women).  
- The columns for theoretical-without-discrimination frequency/participation, which 
give the values obtained when women’s endowments are evaluated with the 
coefficients estimated for men (in the estimated ordered probit model for the sub-
sample of men), which can be assumed to not be subject to gender discrimination.  
If we focus the analysis on participation –as in Figure 5 which gives the data for 
participation– we can see (at the top) that for the “zero promotions” category estimated 
participation by women (42.93%) is greater than it would be if evaluated using the same 
criteria as for men (40.47%). As we move towards the right, the opposite occurs: as the 
number of promotions considered increases, the percentages estimated are smaller than if 
they were evaluated using the same criteria as for men. 
(Theoretic) participation by women decreases sharply as we rise in the intervals for 
“number of promotions” (except for the last of them). But, moreover, examination of the 
columns in the figure for (theoretic) participation by women “without discrimination” show 
that the decrease in the percentages in much less steep. This means that the model “without 
discrimination” results in less inequality in promotion opportunities14. 
The relative gap can be seen at the bottom of the figure. This is the percentage by which 
women’s participation would have to increase in order to reach the level that would exist if 
                                                 
13 Note that women’s frequency at the i-th interval measures the percentage of women at the i-th interval with respect to 
total women in the sample (this indicator is also called “Concentration”): 100×
sampletheinwomentotal
womenofnumber i  
whereas women’s participation at the i-th interval represents the percentage of women at the i-th interval 
with respect to total individuals at the i-th interval:   100×+ ii
i
menofnumberwomenofnumber
womenofnumber     . 
14 Even so, the decreasing trend in the “without discrimination” graph shows that on average women’s endowments (less 
experience and seniority, less stable employment, etc.) would also explain a part of the existing gender differences 
regarding promotion opportunities. 
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there were no discrimination. The relative gap increases, except at the last interval. The fact 
that the relative gap increases might indicate that the obstacles faced by women for 
professional promotion are greater at the positions offering greatest possibilities for 
promotion.  
However, it must be stressed that for the last category –“4 or more promotions”– the 
difference between theoretical participation without discrimination and theoretical 
participation is small than that for the previous category. It may therefore be more correct 
to refer to the result achieved as a non-linear relation between the “number of promotions” 
and the relative gap, because this percentage increases over the first four intervals and 
drops in the last15.  
Finalizing with “number of promotions”, Table 3 shows the Oaxaca decomposition 
obtained from the theoretical frequencies obtained for men and women. The last column of 
the table shows the discrimination percentage for each category, measured as the fraction 
of the difference in men’s and women’s frequencies that cannot be attributed to different 
endowments. This percentage tends to grow with the intervals for “number of promotions”, 
but drops in the last16 of them. This may be related to what happens in the last interval for 
the relative gap. 
• Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 6 reproduce this same method of analysis for “supervision 
levels”. The figure shows a fairly similar result to before: 
- Women’s participation decreases sharply as we rise in the intervals for supervision 
level (except for the last one), whereas women’s participation “without 
discrimination” decreases much more gently. 
- The percentage by which women’s participation should increase in order to reach 
participation without discrimination (the relative gap) increases, except for the last 
interval. This result might indicate that the obstacles faced by women for 
professional promotion increase as they rise in the professional hierarchy, except for 
the upper end. As with number of promotions, the result is non-linear. 
- In the Oaxaca decomposition in Table 5, the discrimination percentage increases 
from “no supervision level” to “one supervision level” and then gradually decreases 
until it reaches “5 or more” when it decreases substantially17.  
                                                 
15 The relative gap drops in the last category for “number of promotions”, “supervision levels” and “supervised people”, 
but not in the case of “net wages”. The interpretation of this result is not easy, but it is necessary to bear in mind that the 
sub-samples corresponding to these last categories are very small, what means that we cannot easily do generalizations 
from them. 
16 Although this result is fairly similar to the one for the relative gap (the percentage by which women’s participation 
would have to increase in order to be equal to women’s participation without discrimination), there is no reason why these 
should be similar, and they can be interpreted differently. In the case of the relative gap, only women’s situations (with 
and without discrimination) are being compared, whereas in the Oaxaca decomposition women’s situations (with and 
without discrimination) are being compared with men’s. So, for example, it might happen that as we rise towards higher 
categories, the relative gap will increase (because discriminatory obstacles to promotion for women increase) whereas 
simultaneously the percentage of discrimination decreases, because as we rise in the intervals women’s average 
endowments become increasingly less appropriate (so frequency would decrease), and this effect is more marked than the 
previous one. 
17 The explanation for the decrease in the discrimination percentage between the second and fourth intervals while the 
relative gap increases may be that, although obstacles to promotion for women increase as they rise in the hierarchy, at the 
same time average women’s endowments become increasingly less appropriate (so frequency decreases even without 
discrimination). That is, when we brake down the differences in men’s and women’s frequencies between differences in 
 22
• Tables 6 and 7 and Figure 7 give results for “number of people supervised” that are 
very similar to those for the “supervision levels”, as was already seen by estimating the 
econometric model. These two variables amount to very similar indicators for the positions 
occupied by men and women in professional hierarchies. 
• Finally, Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 8 show the results for the “net wage” intervals. Unlike 
the three previous cases, in this case the glass ceiling phenomenon is much more marked: 
- Women’s participation drops sharply as we go up the wage intervals, whereas 
women’s participation “without discrimination” drops much more gently. 
- The relative gap increases exponentially, so this might indicate that the obstacles 
faced by women for professional promotion increase as they rise in the professional 
hierarchy (reflected in this case in wage levels). In this case, the non-linearity 
(exponential growth) is very different to the previous three. 
- Moreover, in the Oaxaca decomposition in Table 8, the discrimination percentage 
tends to increase as we rise in the wage ladder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
endowments and differences that cannot be explained by endowments (discrimination), they may both be increasing but if 
the former increases more, the discrimination percentage would be reduced. 
The decrease in the fifth interval may be related to the non-linearity in the relative gap. 
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Table 2. Frequency and participation at each category of number of promotions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number
of Real Theoretic Theoric Real Theoretic Theoretic Relative
promotions without without gap (5)
discrimin. (4) discrimin. (4)
0 84.59% 84.53% 78.76% 41.93% 42.93% 40.47% -5.73%
1 10.25% 10.41% 11.55% 29.34% 30.28% 30.58% 0.99%
2 3.35% 3.30% 5.30% 20.87% 19.96% 27.73% 38.92%
3 0.98% 0.94% 2.89% 10.53% 10.25% 25.47% 148.55%
4 or more 0.84% 0.83% 1.50% 13.19% 14.18% 23.21% 63.74%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 37.19% 37.19% 37.19%
WOMEN
Frequency (2) Participation (3)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number
of Real Theoretic Real Theoretic
promotions
0 69.59% 69.19% 58.07% 57.07%
1 14.66% 14.89% 70.66% 69.72%
2 7.54% 7.89% 79.13% 80.04%
3 4.93% 4.93% 89.47% 89.75%
4 or more 3.27% 3.10% 86.81% 85.82%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 62.81% 62.81%
MEN
Frequency Participation
 
 
 
T
p
 
 Notes: 
(1) Number of women in the sample: 1434; number of men: 2414. 
(2) The frequency of women in the i-th category measures the percentage of women in the i-th category over the total of women in 
the sample 
(3) The participation of women in the i-th category measures the percentage of women in the i-th category over the total for 
women and men in the i-th category 
(5) Relative gap: is the percentage increase required in (theoretic) women participation in order to iqualize the women participation 
without discrimination.   able 3. Pseudo Oaxaca decomposition for frequency at each category of number of 
romotions  
Oaxaca decomposition 
Number Probability Difference Difference not  Percentage 
of  differential in explained by endowments Of 
promotions (total difference) endowments (due to discrimination) Discrimination 
  )(
F
F
M
M PP −  )( MFMM PP −  )( FFMF PP −  )/()( FFMMFFMF PPPP −−  
0 -0.1534 -0.0957 -0.0577 37.59% 
1 0.0448 0.0334 0.0114 25.42% 
2 0.0459 0.0259 0.0200 43.56% 
3 0.0399 0.0204 0.0196 49.01% 
4 or more 0.0228 0.0161 0.0067 29.50% 
Average 0.3475 0.2106 0.1370 39.42% 
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Figure 5. Participation of women at each category of number of promotions: theoretic 
results, with or without discrimination, and the relative gap 
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Table 4. Frequency and participation at each category of levels of supervision  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels
of Real Theoretic Theoretic Real Theoretic Theoretic Relative
supervision without without gap (5)
discrimin. (4) discrimin. (4)
0 87.10% 87.11% 81.07% 40.82% 40.78% 39.05% -4.23%
1 4.39% 4.47% 6.13% 26.64% 27.03% 33.70% 24.70%
2 5.40% 5.38% 7.80% 24.69% 24.67% 32.18% 30.45%
3 or 4 2.57% 2.49% 4.24% 19.69% 19.65% 29.42% 49.68%
5 or more 0.54% 0.55% 0.75% 20.51% 20.05% 25.62% 27.81%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 37.40% 37.40% 37.40%
WOMEN
Frequency (2) Participation (3)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels
of
supervision Real Theoretic Real Theoretic
0 75.43% 75.58% 59.18% 59.22%
1 7.22% 7.21% 73.36% 72.97%
2 9.84% 9.82% 75.31% 75.33%
3 or 4 6.25% 6.08% 80.31% 80.35%
5 or more 1.25% 1.31% 79.49% 79.95%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 62.60% 62.60%
MEN
Frequency Participation
 
 
 
T
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Notes: 
(1) Number of women in the sample: 1434; number of men: 2414. 
(2) The frequency of women in the i-th category measures the percentage of women in the i-th category over the total of women in 
the sample 
(3) The participation of women in the i-th category measures the percentage of women in the i-th category over the total for 
women and men in the i-th category 
(5) Relative gap: is the percentage increase required in (theoretic) women participation in order to iqualize the women participation 
without discrimination.   able 5. Pseudo Oaxaca decomposition for frequency at each category of levels of 
upervision  
Oaxaca decomposition 
Levels Probability Difference Difference not  Percentage 
Of differential in explained by endowments Of 
Supervision (total difference) endowments (due to discrimination) Discrimination 
  )(
F
F
M
M PP −        )( MFMM PP −            )( FFMF PP −   )/()( FFMMFFMF PPPP −−
0 -0.1153 -0.0549 -0.0604 52.39% 
1 0.0274 0.0107 0.0166 60.78% 
2 0.0444 0.0202 0.0242 54.45% 
3 or 4 0.0359 0.0184 0.0175 48.80% 
5 or more 0.0076 0.0055 0.0021 27.05% 
Average 0.2542 0.1285 0.1258 49.47% 
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Figure 6. Participation of women at each category of levels of supervision: theoretic 
results, with or without discrimination, and the relative gap 
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Table 6. Frequency and participation at each category of number of people supervised  
 
 Number of
people Real Theoretic Theoric Real Theoretic Theoretic Relative
supervised without without gap (5)
discrimin. (4) discrimin. (4)
0 86.46% 86.59% 80.45% 40.82% 40.90% 39.13% -4.32%
1-2 5.50% 5.60% 6.45% 30.60% 30.53% 33.60% 10.08%
3-5 3.15% 3.11% 4.77% 24.61% 23.84% 32.43% 36.05%
6-9 1.68% 1.60% 2.82% 21.19% 20.50% 31.29% 52.62%
10-20 1.74% 1.63% 3.23% 18.18% 17.60% 29.77% 69.11%
21-60 1.07% 0.98% 1.69% 18.60% 17.76% 27.25% 53.46%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
re than 60 0.40% 0.50% 0.59% 18.18% 20.85% 23.77% 14.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 37.31% 37.31% 37.31%
WOMEN
Frequency (2) Participation (3)
Number of
people
supervised Real Theoretic Real Theoretic
0 74.59% 74.47% 59.18% 59.10%
1-2 7.42% 7.58% 69.40% 69.47%
3-5 5.74% 5.91% 75.39% 76.16%
6-9 3.71% 3.69% 78.81% 79.50%
10-20 4.67% 4.54% 81.82% 82.40%
21-60 2.79% 2.69% 81.40% 82.24%
More than 60 1.08% 1.12% 81.82% 79.15%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 62.69% 62.69%
Frequency Participation
MEN
 
 
T
p
 
 
 
 
 Notes: 
(1) Number of women in the sample: 1434; number of men: 2414. 
(2) The frequency of women in the i-th category measures the percentage of women in the i-th category over the total of women in 
the sample 
(3) The participation of women in the i-th category measures the percentage of women in the i-th category over the total for 
women and men in the i-th category 
(5) Relative gap: is the percentage increase required in (theoretic) women participation in order to iqualize the women participation 
without discrimination.   able 7. Pseudo Oaxaca decomposition for frequency at each category of number of 
eople supervised  
Oaxaca decomposition 
Number of Probability Difference Difference not  Percentage 
Supervised differential in explained by endowments Of 
People (total difference) endowments (due to discrimination) discrimination 
      )( FFMM PP −       )( MFMM PP − )( FFMF PP −       )/()( FFMMFFMF PPPP −−
0 -0.1213 -0.0598 -0.0614 50.67% 
1-2 0.0198 0.0113 0.0085 42.84% 
3-5 0.0280 0.0114 0.0166 59.18% 
6-9 0.0209 0.0087 0.0122 58.55% 
10-20 0.0291 0.0131 0.0160 55.11% 
21-60 0.0171 0.0100 0.0072 41.85% 
More than 60 0.0062 0.0053 0.0009 14.58% 
Average 0.3782 0.1943 0.1839 48.62% 
28
Figure 7. Participation of women at each category of number of people supervised: 
theoretic results, with or without discrimination, and the relative gap 
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Table 8. Frequency and participation at each category of weekly net wage  
 
 Wage
intervals Real Theoretic Theoric Real Theoretic Theoretic Relative
(euros) without without gap (5)
discrimin. (4) discrimin. (4)
Until 270 5.34% 5.65% 3.70% 86.25% 85.97% 80.04% -6.89%
270-450 10.53% 9.88% 7.39% 73.12% 72.01% 65.82% -8.61%
450-601 19.50% 19.66% 11.12% 64.12% 64.12% 50.25% -21.62%
601-901 31.73% 31.67% 33.39% 34.48% 34.67% 35.87% 3.47%
901-1202 17.57% 18.05% 21.96% 26.49% 26.85% 30.86% 14.96%
1202-1652 10.99% 10.84% 12.86% 28.86% 28.36% 31.95% 12.65%
1652-2103 3.48% 3.39% 6.14% 22.06% 21.65% 33.39% 54.18%
2103-3005 0.77% 0.78% 2.55% 12.35% 12.83% 32.45% 152.88%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than 3005 0.08% 0.07% 0.90% 3.23% 3.02% 28.06% 828.44%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 36.78% 36.78% 36.78%
WOMEN
Participation (3)Frequency (2)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wage
intervals
(euros) Real Theoretic Real Theoretic
Until 270 0.50% 0.54% 13.75% 14.03%
270-450 2.25% 2.23% 26.88% 27.99%
450-601 6.35% 6.40% 35.88% 35.88%
601-901 35.07% 34.73% 65.52% 65.33%
901-1202 28.37% 28.62% 73.51% 73.15%
1202-1652 15.76% 15.93% 71.14% 71.64%
1652-2103 7.16% 7.13% 77.94% 78.35%
2103-3005 3.20% 3.08% 87.65% 87.17%
More than 3005 1.35% 1.34% 96.77% 96.98%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 63.22% 63.22%
Frequency Participation
MEN
 
 
Table 9. Pseudo Oaxaca decomposition for frequency at each category of weekly net wage   
Oaxaca decomposition 
Wage Probability Difference Difference not  Percentage 
intervals differential in explained by endowments Of 
(Euros) (total difference) endowments (due to discrimination) Discrimination 
           )( FFMM PP − )( MFMM PP −  )( FFMF PP −    )/()( FFMMFFMF PPPP −−
Until 270 -0.0512 -0.0316 -0.0195 38.15% 
270-450 -0.0764 -0.0516 -0.0249 32.53% 
450-601 -0.1326 -0.0471 -0.0855 64.45% 
601-901 0.0305 0.0134 0.0171 56.15% 
901-1202 0.1056 0.0666 0.0391 36.98% 
1202-1652 0.0509 0.0308 0.0201 39.58% 
1652-2103 0.0374 0.0099 0.0276 73.63% 
2103-3005 0.0230 0.0054 0.0177 76.69% 
More than 3005 0.0127 0.0044 0.0083 65.19% 
Average 0.9143 0.4465 0.4678 51.17% 
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Figure 8. Participation of women at each category of weekly net wage: theoretic results, 
with or without discrimination, and the relative gap 
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Final Remarks 
 
This paper has attempted to test the hypothesis that a glass ceiling exists in the Spanish 
labor market. (The glass ceiling is understood as being an increasing number of obstacles to 
promotion for women as they rise in the professional hierarchy). A number of promotion 
indicators were selected: “number of promotions”, “supervision levels”, “number of people 
supervised” and “net wage”. Then, for each of the categories of these variables, ordered 
from the smallest to the largest, the relative gaps were calculated (the relative gap measures 
the percentage by which women’s participation would have to increase in order to reach the 
level that would exist if there were no discrimination). In order to calculate these relative 
gaps, for each of the indicators one ordered probit model was estimated for women and 
another for men; these models allows to calculate the probabilities (or theoretical 
frequencies) of the presence of women/men at each of the intervals considered. We believe 
this method has not previously been applied in this context. 
The relative gaps calculated for the four variables show that: 
- In all cases, women’s participation tends to fall as the intervals rise. Women’s 
participation “without discrimination” also tends to decrease but much less sharply.  
- In line with the above, in all cases the percentage by which women’s participation 
would have to increase in order to reach the level of participation “without 
discrimination” (the relative gap) tends to increase as the intervals rise. 
- However, for “number of promotions”, “supervision levels” and “number of people 
supervised”, the above result is not linear, because the relative gap decreases at the 
highest interval. This seems to contradict the hypothesis that at the highest levels of 
the professional hierarchy the obstacles to the presence of women are greatest. All 
the same, for “net wage” this phenomenon does not occur; in this case the relative 
gap increases exponentially. 
These results support the hypothesis that there is a glass ceiling in the Spanish labor 
market. This result is especially important if “net wage” is used as indicator for the 
professional level reached. 
When the Oaxaca decomposition is applied to the four variables, for “supervision levels”, 
“number of people supervised” and “net wage” the (average) discrimination percentage is 
about 50%, whereas for “number of promotions” it is about 40%. 
With respect to the limitations of our analysis we have to point out, amongst other, that the 
ECVT only gives information on employed workers, what can be biasing our results. And 
that the results on discrimination obtained as residuals must be taken with caution as there 
are variables for promotion that cannot be quantified, such as effort, capacity for relating to 
others, etc.; or variables, such as experience or education, which in principle were 
considered exogenous but which may be endogenous. 
The present work is open to further extensions. Some of the most relevant would be to 
combine the survey used here (for 2001) with those for 2000 and 2002 in order to obtain a 
larger sample, to study the relative importance of the glass ceiling in the public and private 
sectors, etc. 
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Dependent variable: NUMASCEMCAT 
Order Probit Model Estimation Results 
Variables Male Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient Variables
Male 
Coefficient
Female 
Coefficient Variables
Male 
Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient
LOG(EDAD) -1.014* 
(0.174) 
-0.988* 
(0.285) CCAA05 
-0.453** 
(0.191) 
-0.081 
(0.239) OCUL_C 
-6.926* 
(0.370) - 
CASADO 0.188** 
(0.080) 
0.369* 
(0.102) CCAA06 
-0.395** 
(0.189) 
-0.682 
(0.354) OCUL_D 
0.640** 
(0.265) 
0.433 
(0.517) 
NUMHIJOS 0.007 
(0.030) 
-0.061 
(0.057) CCAA07 
-0.132 
(0.157) 
-0.022 
(0.270) OCUL_E 
0.433 
(0.269) 
0.424 
(0.519) 
SPRIVAD 0.214 
(0.126) 
0.475* 
(0.180) CCAA08 
-0.648* 
(0.182) 
-1.166* 
(0.417) OCUL_F 
0.451 
(0.239) 
0.444 
(0.488) 
PARCIAL -0.555** 
(0.226) 
-0.647* 
(0.197) CCAA09 
-0.044 
(0.118) 
-0.319 
(0.174) OCUL_G 
0.747* 
(0.267) 
0.077 
(0.501) 
LOG(ANTIGA
EM+1) 
0.751* 
(0.058) 
0.691* 
(0.082) CCAA10 
-0.128 
(0.135) 
-0.296 
(0.213) OCUL_H 
0.543 
(0.284) 
-0.242 
(0.513) 
TEMPORAL -0.222** 
(0.099) 
-0.274 
(0.148) CCAA11 
-0.496* 
(0.191) 
-0.173 
(0.295) OCUL_K 
0.719** 
(0.293) 
0.054 
(0.520) 
TAMA2 0.226* 
(0.087) 
0.031 
(0.148) CCAA12 
-0.279** 
(0.133) 
-0.448 
(0.259) OCUL_L 
-0.523 
(0.436) 
-6.634* 
(0.648) 
TAMA3 0.325* 
(0.098) 
-0.017 
(0.163) CCAA14 
-0.076 
(0.172) 
-0.335 
(0.278) OCUL_M 
0.616** 
(0.247) 
0.913 
(0.763) 
TAMA4 0.563* 
(0.096) 
-0.072 
(0.146) CCAA15 
-0.075 
(0.181) 
-0.040 
(0.203) OCUL_N 
0.584** 
(0.250) 
0.926 
(0.811) 
PROLON1 0.251** 
(0.104) 
0.533* 
(0.153) CCAA16 
-0.042 
(0.139) 
-0.102 
(0.195) OCUL_P 
0.670** 
(0.272) 
0.198 
(0.621) 
ADECUA2 -0.187** 
(0.089) 
-0.219 
(0.134) CCAA17 
-0.340 
(0.181) 
-0.069 
(0.242) OCUL_Q 
0.707* 
(0.250) 
-0.287 
(0.561) 
REPETITI -0.167** 
(0.069) 
-0.288** 
(0.114) ACTL_A 
0.075 
(0.341) 
-6.644* 
(0.473) OCUL_R 
0.155 
(0.267) 
0.087 
(1.082) 
FORMACIO 0.318* 
(0.067) 
0.248** 
(0.109) ACTL_B 
0.940** 
(0.404) 
-5.900* 
(0.430) OCUL_S 
-0.018 
(0.274) 
-0.067 
(0.531) 
MASESTUD 0.159** 
(0.065) 
0.302* 
(0.102) ACTL_C 
0.325 
(0.317) 
-6.355* 
(0.778) OCUL_T 
-0.032 
(0.262) 
-0.490 
(0.587) 
EDU01 2.273* 
(0.541) 
-5.715* 
(0.456) ACTL_D 
0.325 
(0.196) 
-0.268 
(0.278) OCUL_U 
1.532* 
(0.311) 
2.941* 
(0.583) 
EDU02 -0.228 
(0.241) 
-7.301* 
(0.339) ACTL_E 
0.221 
(0.276) 
-0.766 
(0.631) LIMIT_1 
-0.491 
(0.578) 
-1.216 
(1.015) 
EDU03 -0.140 
(0.173) 
-0.091 
(0.340) ACTL_F 
0.201 
(0.210) 
-0.676 
(0.514) LIMIT_2 
0.247 
(0.574) 
-0.275 
(1.005) 
EDU04 0.177 
(0.152) 
0.056 
(0.217) ACTL_G 
-0.018 
(0.217) 
-0.069 
(0.272) LIMIT_3 
0.833 
(0.573) 
0.421 
(1.000) 
EDU05 0.095 
(0.169) 
0.304 
(0.239) ACTL_H 
0.029 
(0.259) 
0.086 
(0.295) LIMIT_4 
1.490* 
(0.572) 
0.851 
(1.003) 
EDU06 0.093 
(0.163) 
0.110 
(0.213) ACTL_I 
0.061 
(0.195) 
0.178 
(0.301) Pseudo-R
2 0.237 0.288 
EDU07 0.190 
(0.151) 
-0.082 
(0.198) ACTL_J 
0.780* 
(0.236) 
0.294 
(0.270) 
Log 
likelihood -1821.374 -585.863 
EDU08 0.245 
(0.142) 
0.002 
(0.180) ACTL_K 
0.054 
(0.214) 
-0.318 
(0.256) LR statistic
a 1132.01* 
(0.000) (74df) 
474.516* 
(0.000) (73df)
EDU10 0.179 
(0.191) 
0.278 
(0.240) ACTL_M 
-0.204 
(0.206) 
-0.909* 
(0.242) 
Number of 
Obs. 2414 1434 
EDU11 0.076 
(0.332) 
-1.105 
(0.641) ACTL_N 
-0.635* 
(0.207) 
-0.526** 
(0.222) 
LR statistica
Educations 
27.911* 
(0.002) 
16.747 
(0.080) 
CCAA01 -0.350* 
(0.133) 
-0.895* 
(0.275) ACTL_O 
-0.074 
(0.253) 
0.235 
(0.262) 
LR statistica
CCAA regions
44.930* 
(0.000) 
34.610* 
(0.004) 
CCAA02 -0.141 
(0.133) 
-0.589** 
(0.262) ACTL_P 
-6.077* 
(0.274) 
-6.913* 
(0.411) 
LR statistica
Activities 
52.163* 
(0.000) 
40.187* 
(0.000) 
CCAA03 0.122 
(0.144) 
-0.689** 
(0.346) OCUL_A 
0.952* 
(0.291) 
0.939 
(0.563) 
LR statistica
Ocupatios 
92.897* 
(0.000) 
30.396** 
(0.024) 
CCAA04 0.140 
(0.148) 
-0.451 
(0.293) OCUL_B 
2.243* 
(0.602) 
-0.404 
(0.573) 
LR statistica
SEX 
35.460* 
(0.000) 
Standard deviation into brackets; a χ2(df) Log likelihood ratio test p-value into brackets; *significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level 
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NUMASCEMCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
MALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
0 1680 2141 -461 1670.158 9.842 
1 354 176 178 359.443 -5.443 
2 182 21 161 190.470 -8.470 
3 119 16 103 119.000 0.000 
4 79 60 19 74.929 4.071 
Total 2414 2414  2414  
NUMASCEMCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
FEMALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
0 1213 1364 -151 1212.140 0.860 
1 147 62 85 149.285 -2.285 
2 48 5 43 47.305 0.695 
3 14 0 14 13.411 0.589 
4 12 3 9 11.860 0.140 
Total 1434 1434  1434  
 
NUMASCEMCAT 
Frequencies 
MALE FEMALE 
Categories Real-Observed Estimated Error 
Real-
Observed Estimated Error 
0 69.59% 69.19% 0.408% 84.59% 84.53% 0.060% 
1 14.66% 14.89% -0.225% 10.25% 10.41% -0.159% 
2 7.54% 7.89% -0.351% 3.35% 3.30% 0.048% 
3 4.93% 4.93% 0.000% 0.98% 0.94% 0.041% 
4 3.27% 3.10% 0.169% 0.84% 0.83% 0.010% 
Total 100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00%  
 
NUMASCEMCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING MALE ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=0|X) 72.75% 69.19% 78.76% 
P(y=1|X) 13.64% 14.89% 11.55% 
P(y=2|X) 6.92% 7.89% 5.30% 
P(y=3|X) 4.17% 4.93% 2.89% 
P(y=4|X) 2.51% 3.10% 1.50% 
Total number Obs 3848 2414 1434 
Expectet Value [4] 0.500 0.579 0.368 
 
NUMASCEMCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING FEMALE ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=0|X) 79.18% 76.01% 84.53% 
P(y=1|X) 13.17% 14.82% 10.41% 
P(y=2|X) 4.72% 5.56% 3.30% 
P(y=3|X) 1.45% 1.75% 0.94% 
P(y=4|X) 1.48% 1.87% 0.83% 
Total number Obs 3848 2414 1434 
Expectet Value [4] 0.329 0.387 0.231 
        
NUMASCEMCAT CATEGORIES 
0:0 
1:1 
2:2 
3:3 
4:4 or more 
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Dependent variable: SUPERNIVCAT 
Order Probit Model Estimation Results 
Variables Male Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient Variables 
Male 
Coefficient
Female 
Coefficient Variables 
Male 
Coefficient
Female 
Coefficient
LOG(EDAD) 0.386* 
(0.147) 
-0.204 
(0.255) CCAA06 
-0.405** 
(0.163) 
-0.235 
(0.265) OCUL_D 
0.487 
(0.249) 
-0.202 
(0.562) 
CASADO 0.207* 
(0.080) 
0.180 
(0.102) CCAA07 
-0.364** 
(0.158) 
-0.003 
(0.275) OCUL_E 
0.553** 
(0.261) 
-0.660 
(0.578) 
NUMHIJOS 0.031 
(0.025) 
0.042 
(0.053) CCAA08 
-0.490* 
(0.162) 
-0.443 
(0.286) OCUL_F 
0.476** 
(0.226) 
-0.951 
(0.557) 
SPRIVAD 0.049 
(0.126) 
0.251 
(0.175) CCAA09 
-0.428* 
(0.116) 
0.081 
(0.183) OCUL_G 
0.395 
(0.252) 
-1.315** 
(0.571) 
LOG(ANTIGAEM+1) 0.084** 
(0.039) 
0.172** 
(0.071) CCAA10 
-0.194 
(0.129) 
0.123 
(0.213) OCUL_H 
0.641** 
(0.288) 
-1.360** 
(0.572) 
LOG(HORASEM) 0.460* 
(0.161) 
0.925* 
(0.241) CCAA11 
-0.371** 
(0.164) 
-0.242 
(0.366) OCUL_K 
0.463 
(0.287) 
-1.029 
(0.582) 
TEMPORAL -0.309* 
(0.093) 
-0.205 
(0.143) CCAA12 
-0.348* 
(0.126) 
-0.067 
(0.269) OCUL_L 
0.239 
(0.319) 
-7.735* 
(0.745) 
TAMA2 0.376* 
(0.085) 
0.023 
(0.143) CCAA14 
-0.192 
(0.178) 
-0.040 
(0.366) OCUL_M 
0.507** 
(0.239) 
-0.275 
(0.730) 
TAMA3 0.394* 
(0.096) 
-0.161 
(0.182) CCAA15 
-0.500* 
(0.184) 
-0.328 
(0.282) OCUL_N 
0.377 
(0.242) 
-8.880* 
(0.630) 
TAMA4 0.356* 
(0.096) 
0.052 
(0.154) CCAA16 
-0.515* 
(0.140) 
-0.116 
(0.217) OCUL_P 
0.634** 
(0.264) 
-1.342** 
(0.655) 
PROLON1 0.310* 
(0.095) 
0.482* 
(0.152) CCAA17 
-0.426* 
(0.165) 
-0.189 
(0.248) OCUL_Q 
0.597** 
(0.242) 
-1.467** 
(0.637) 
ADECUA2 -0.073 
(0.088) 
-0.441* 
(0.148) ACTL_A 
0.216 
(0.265) 
-6.781* 
(0.455) OCUL_R 
-0.166 
(0.262) 
-8.977* 
(0.645) 
REPETITI -0.204* 
(0.067) 
-0.193 
(0.112) ACTL_B 
0.214 
(0.475) 
-6.326* 
(0.503) OCUL_S 
-0.080 
(0.296) 
-1.427** 
(0.633) 
FORMACIO 0.332* 
(0.069) 
0.425* 
(0.108) ACTL_C 
-0.384 
(0.388) 
2.122* 
(0.573) OCUL_T 
-0.048 
(0.249) 
-0.867 
(0.615) 
EDU01 -7.184* 
(0.228) 
-7.079* 
(0.329) ACTL_D 
0.008 
(0.182) 
0.368 
(0.269) OCUL_U 
1.453* 
(0.387) 
1.547** 
(0.641) 
EDU02 -1.088* 
(0.218) 
-7.910* 
(0.439) ACTL_E 
0.118 
(0.298) 
-0.590 
(0.470) LIMIT_1 
3.957* 
(0.795) 
2.796** 
(1.340) 
EDU03 -0.777* 
(0.158) 
-0.958* 
(0.311) ACTL_F 
0.078 
(0.198) 
0.863 
(0.499) LIMIT_2 
4.276* 
(0.795) 
3.141** 
(1.342) 
EDU04 -0.592* 
(0.138) 
-0.926* 
(0.230) ACTL_G 
0.060 
(0.200) 
0.227 
(0.289) LIMIT_3 
4.917* 
(0.795) 
3.857* 
(1.347) 
EDU05 -0.503* 
(0.161) 
-0.511 
(0.266) ACTL_H 
-0.157 
(0.244) 
0.489 
(0.312) LIMIT_4 
5.943* 
(0.794) 
4.886* 
(1.366) 
EDU06 -0.433* 
(0.148) 
-0.512** 
(0.213) ACTL_I 
-0.109 
(0.188) 
0.327 
(0.328) Pseudo-R
2 0.153 0.233 
EDU07 -0.485* 
(0.133) 
-0.655* 
(0.192) ACTL_J 
-0.015 
(0.217) 
-0.009 
(0.307) 
Log 
likelihood -1804.140 -609.974 
EDU08 -0.080 
(0.129) 
-0.259 
(0.166) ACTL_K 
-0.030 
(0.199) 
-0.023 
(0.267) LR statistic
a 649.432* 
(0.000) (73 d.f.)
371.544* 
(0.000) (72 d.f.)
EDU10 0.330** 
(0.167) 
-0.248 
(0.225) ACTL_M 
-0.567* 
(0.191) 
-0.933* 
(0.237) Number of Obs. 2479 1481 
EDU11 -0.291 
(0.287) 
-1.008 
(0.553) ACTL_N 
-0.554* 
(0.190) 
0.047 
(0.202) 
LR statistica
Educations 
46.666* 
(0.000) 
23.221* 
(0.010) 
CCAA01 -0.346* 
(0.124) 
-0.067 
(0.238) ACTL_O 
0.160 
(0.241) 
0.348 
(0.261) 
LR statistica
CCAA regions 
32.904* 
(0.008) 
9.044 
(0.912) 
CCAA02 -0.512* 
(0.162) 
0.066 
(0.276) ACTL_P 
0.051 
(0.388) 
-6.022* 
(0.414) 
LR statistica
Activities 
23.386 
(0.076) 
47.260* 
(0.000) 
CCAA03 -0.323** 
(0.159) 
-0.188 
(0.287) OCUL_A 
1.384* 
(0.256) 
0.329 
(0.619) 
LR statistica
Ocupatios 
93.748* 
(0.000) 
52.439* 
(0.000) 
CCAA04 -0.200 
(0.149) 
-0.151 
(0.297) OCUL_B 
1.394* 
(0.340) 
-1.220 
(0.735) 
LR statistica
SEX 
23.736 
(0.000) 
CCAA05 -0.555* 
(0.171) 
0.132 
(0.241) OCUL_C 
0.724 
(0.810) -    
Standard deviation into brackets; a χ2(df) Log likelihood ratio test p-value into brackets; *significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level 
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SUPERNIVCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
MALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
0 1870 2391 -521 1873.7 -3.72 
1 179 0 179 178.7 0.34 
2 244 0 244 243.4 0.59 
3 155 82 73 150.8 4.18 
4 31 6 25 32.4 -1.40 
Total 2479 2479  2479   
SUPERNIVCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
FEMALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
0 1290 1457 -167 1290.1 -0.11 
1 65 0 65 66.2 -1.18 
2 80 6 74 79.7 0.30 
3 38 15 23 36.9 1.11 
4 8 3 5 8.1 -0.12 
Total 1481 1481  1481   
 
SUPERNIVCAT 
Frecuencies MALE FEMALE 
Categories Real-Observed Estimated Error 
Real-
Observed Estimated Error 
0 75.43% 75.58% -0.150% 87.10% 87.11% -0.007% 
1 7.22% 7.21% 0.014% 4.39% 4.47% -0.079% 
2 9.84% 9.82% 0.024% 5.40% 5.38% 0.020% 
3 6.25% 6.08% 0.169% 2.57% 2.49% 0.075% 
4 1.25% 1.31% -0.056% 0.54% 0.55% -0.008% 
Total 100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00%  
 
SUPERNIVCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING MALE ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=0|X) 77.64% 75.58% 81.07% 
P(y=1|X) 6.81% 7.21% 6.13% 
P(y=2|X) 9.06% 9.82% 7.80% 
P(y=3|X) 5.40% 6.08% 4.24% 
P(y=4|X) 1.10% 1.31% 0.75% 
Total number Obs 3960 2479 1481 
Expectet Value [4] 0.455 0.503 0.375 
 
SUPERNIVCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING FEMALE ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=0|X) 81.22% 77.70% 87.11% 
P(y=1|X) 5.51% 6.13% 4.47% 
P(y=2|X) 7.66% 9.02% 5.38% 
P(y=3|X) 4.43% 5.59% 2.49% 
P(y=4|X) 1.18% 1.56% 0.55% 
Total number Obs 3960 2479 1481 
Expectet Value [4] 0.388 0.472 0.249 
 
SUPERNIVCAT CATEGORIES 
0: 0 levels 
1: 1 levels 
2: 2 levels 
3: 3 or 4 levels 
4: 5 or more levels 
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Dependent variable: SUPERTOTCAT 
Order Probit Model Estimation Results 
Variables Male Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient Variables 
Male 
Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient Variables 
Male 
Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient 
LOG(EDAD) -0.872 
(2.287) 
8.068** 
(4.077) CCAA06 
-0.457* 
(0.164) 
-0.269 
(0.268) OCUL_E 
0.416 
(0.265) 
-0.583 
(0.500) 
LOG(EDAD)^2 0.175 
(0.315) 
-1.140** 
(0.575) CCAA07 
-0.311** 
(0.153) 
0.045 
(0.252) OCUL_F 
0.237 
(0.234) 
-0.670 
(0.480) 
CASADO 0.223* 
(0.080) 
0.131 
(0.105) CCAA08 
-0.428* 
(0.159) 
-0.620** 
(0.267) OCUL_G 
0.221 
(0.255) 
-1.096** 
(0.500) 
NUMHIJOS 0.040 
(0.026) 
0.009 
(0.053) CCAA09 
-0.299* 
(0.110) 
0.035 
(0.180) OCUL_H 
0.299 
(0.288) 
-1.216** 
(0.494) 
SPRIVAD 0.083 
(0.128) 
0.275 
(0.168) CCAA10 
-0.200 
(0.121) 
0.034 
(0.206) OCUL_K 
0.211 
(0.285) 
-0.940 
(0.509) 
LOG(ANTIGAEM+1) 0.094** 
(0.038) 
0.182* 
(0.066) CCAA11 
-0.391** 
(0.168) 
-0.325 
(0.346) OCUL_L 
0.042 
(0.323) 
-7.464* 
(0.674) 
LOG(HORASEM) 0.574* 
(0.164) 
0.802* 
(0.216) CCAA12 
-0.336** 
(0.131) 
-0.279 
(0.268) OCUL_M 
0.266 
(0.253) 
0.328 
(0.850) 
TEMPORAL -0.244* 
(0.093) 
-0.149 
(0.136) CCAA14 
-0.238 
(0.174) 
-0.141 
(0.348) OCUL_N 
0.122 
(0.255) 
-8.839* 
(0.805) 
TAMA2 0.380* 
(0.081) 
0.119 
(0.143) CCAA15 
-0.349 
(0.185) 
-0.520** 
(0.238) OCUL_P 
0.317 
(0.268) 
-0.966 
(0.562) 
TAMA3 0.472* 
(0.095) 
0.002 
(0.176) CCAA16 
-0.512* 
(0.141) 
-0.109 
(0.212) OCUL_Q 
0.358 
(0.250) 
-1.064 
(0.567) 
TAMA4 0.432* 
(0.096) 
0.162 
(0.152) CCAA17 
-0.411* 
(0.150) 
-0.092 
(0.257) OCUL_R 
-0.383 
(0.272) 
-8.798* 
(0.581) 
PROLON1 0.303* 
(0.093) 
0.378* 
(0.145) ACTL_A 
0.407 
(0.267) 
-6.757* 
(0.370) OCUL_S 
-0.234 
(0.299) 
-1.371** 
(0.560) 
ADECUA2 -0.142 
(0.083) 
-0.401* 
(0.141) ACTL_B 
0.263 
(0.449) 
-6.303* 
(0.468) OCUL_T 
-0.349 
(0.264) 
-0.635 
(0.542) 
REPETITI -0.185* 
(0.066) 
-0.245** 
(0.111) ACTL_C 
-0.331 
(0.377) 
2.117* 
(0.678) OCUL_U 
1.487* 
(0.400) 
10.373* 
(0.597) 
FORMACIO 0.395* 
(0.068) 
0.388* 
(0.104) ACTL_D 
0.155 
(0.184) 
0.138 
(0.264) LIMIT_1 
2.151 
(4.175) 
17.481** 
(7.335) 
EDU01 -7.340* 
(0.219) 
-6.936* 
(0.330) ACTL_E 
0.091 
(0.260) 
-0.512 
(0.471) LIMIT_2 
2.484 
(4.175) 
17.913** 
(7.334) 
EDU02 -1.103* 
(0.210) 
-7.830* 
(0.378) ACTL_F 
0.213 
(0.204) 
0.262 
(0.373) LIMIT_3 
2.815 
(4.176) 
18.275** 
(7.337) 
EDU03 -0.859* 
(0.154) 
-1.122* 
(0.313) ACTL_G 
0.188 
(0.194) 
0.265 
(0.291) LIMIT_4 
3.088 
(4.175) 
18.550** 
(7.329) 
EDU04 -0.628* 
(0.141) 
-0.648* 
(0.219) ACTL_H 
0.111 
(0.244) 
0.608** 
(0.292) LIMIT_5 
3.609 
(4.170) 
19.016** 
(7.344) 
EDU05 -0.519* 
(0.160) 
-0.385 
(0.242) ACTL_I 
0.009 
(0.198) 
0.237 
(0.320) LIMIT_6 
4.311 
(4.175) 
19.668* 
(7.340) 
EDU06 -0.430* 
(0.147) 
-0.458** 
(0.210) ACTL_J 
-0.264 
(0.202) 
-0.223 
(0.286) Pseudo-R
2 0.144 0.214 
EDU07 -0.481* 
(0.133) 
-0.428** 
(0.182) ACTL_K 
0.111 
(0.194) 
-0.246 
(0.277) 
Log 
likelihood -2122.866 -708.482 
EDU08 -0.098 
(0.127) 
-0.119 
(0.149) ACTL_M 
-0.446** 
(0.188) 
-0.761* 
(0.235) LR statistic
a 716.580 
(0.000) (74df)
385.539 
(0.000) (73df)
EDU10 0.382** 
(0.174) 
-0.108 
(0.221) ACTL_N 
-0.491* 
(0.185) 
0.056 
(0.193) Number of Obs. 2507 1492 
EDU11 -0.474 
(0.276) 
-0.663 
(0.439) ACTL_O 
0.202 
(0.235) 
0.207 
(0.274) 
LR statistica
Educations 
55.990* 
(0.000) 
18.574** 
(0.046) 
CCAA01 -0.277** 
(0.119) 
-0.124 
(0.243) ACTL_P 
0.250 
(0.411) 
-5.939* 
(0.411) 
LR statistica
CCAA regions 
29.979** 
(0.018) 
11.996 
(0.744) 
CCAA02 -0.415** 
(0.162) 
-0.052 
(0.269) OCUL_A 
1.228* 
(0.265) 
0.546 
(0.539) 
LR statistica
Activities 
28.217** 
(0.020) 
40.482* 
(0.000) 
CCAA03 -0.243 
(0.164) 
-0.243 
(0.297) OCUL_B 
1.214* 
(0.430) 
-0.506 
(0.836) 
LR statistica
Ocupatios 
102.842* 
(0.000) 
62.254* 
(0.000) 
CCAA04 -0.078 
(0.131) 
-0.073 
(0.300) OCUL_C 
0.454 
(0.902) - 
LR statistica
SEX 
27.670* 
(0.000) 
CCAA05 -0.556* 
(0.174) 
-0.161 
(0.225) OCUL_D 
0.307 
(0.260) 
-0.027 
(0.489)    
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SUPERTOTCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
MALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
0 1870 2443 -573 1866.87 3.13 
1 186 0 186 190.09 -4.09 
2 144 0 144 148.18 -4.18 
3 93 0 93 92.53 0.47 
4 117 19 98 113.84 3.16 
5 70 30 40 67.38 2.62 
6 27 15 12 28.11 -1.11 
Total 2507 2507  2507  
SUPERTOTCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
FEMALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
0 1290 1478 -188 1291.97 -1.97 
1 82 0 82 83.52 -1.52 
2 47 0 47 46.37 0.63 
3 25 0 25 23.86 1.14 
4 26 0 26 24.32 1.68 
5 16 7 9 14.55 1.45 
6 6 7 -1 7.40 -1.40 
Total 1492  1492   1492   
SUPERTOTCAT 
Frecuencies MALE FEMALE 
Categories Real-Observada Estimated Error 
Real-
Observada Estimated Error 
0 74.59% 74.47% 0.125% 86.46% 86.59% -0.132% 
1 7.42% 7.58% -0.163% 5.50% 5.60% -0.102% 
2 5.74% 5.91% -0.167% 3.15% 3.11% 0.042% 
3 3.71% 3.69% 0.019% 1.68% 1.60% 0.076% 
4 4.67% 4.54% 0.126% 1.74% 1.63% 0.113% 
5 2.79% 2.69% 0.104% 1.07% 0.98% 0.097% 
6 1.08% 1.12% -0.044% 0.40% 0.50% -0.094% 
Total 100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00%  
 
SUPERTOTCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING MALE ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=0|X) 76.70% 74.47% 80.45% 
P(y=1|X) 7.16% 7.58% 6.45% 
P(y=2|X) 5.48% 5.91% 4.77% 
P(y=3|X) 3.37% 3.69% 2.82% 
P(y=4|X) 4.05% 4.54% 3.23% 
P(y=5|X) 2.32% 2.69% 1.69% 
P(y=6|X) 0.92% 1.12% 0.59% 
Total number Obs 3999 2507 1492 
Expectet Value [4] 0.6156 0.688 0.494 
SUPERTOTCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING FEMALE ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=0|X) 81.61% 78.64% 86.59% 
P(y=1|X) 6.66% 7.30% 5.60% 
P(y=2|X) 4.08% 4.66% 3.11% 
P(y=3|X) 2.28% 2.68% 1.60% 
P(y=4|X) 2.53% 3.07% 1.63% 
P(y=5|X) 1.70% 2.12% 0.98% 
P(y=6|X) 1.14% 1.53% 0.50% 
Total number Obs. 3999 2507 1492 
Expectet Value [4] 0.4713 0.567 0.310 
 
SUPERTOT CATEGORIES 
0:0 
1:1-2 
2:3-5 
3:6-9 
4:10-20 
5:21-60 
6:More than 60 
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Dependent variable: SALARIOCAT 
Order Probit Model Estimation Results 
Variables Male Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient Variables 
Male 
Coefficient 
Female 
Coefficient Variables Male Coefficient
Female 
Coefficient 
LOG(EDAD) 4.739* (1.757) 
1.843 
(2.545) CCAA07 
-0.082 
(0.127) 
0.104 
(0.181) OCUL_G 
-0.319 
(0.183) 
-1.185** 
(0.538) 
LOG(EDAD)^2 -0.570** (0.244) 
-0.164 
(0.360) CCAA08 
-0.298** 
(0.130) 
-0.002 
(0.160) OCUL_H 
-0.377 
(0.220) 
-1.084** 
(0.546) 
CASADO 0.379* (0.064) 
0.129 
(0.068) CCAA09 
0.109 
(0.110) 
-0.046 
(0.145) OCUL_K 
-0.285 
(0.214) 
-1.173** 
(0.547) 
NUMHIJOS 0.027 (0.021) 
0.041 
(0.032) CCAA10 
-0.099 
(0.108) 
-0.054 
(0.165) OCUL_L 
-0.511** 
(0.231) 
-2.238* 
(0.729) 
SPRIVAD -0.235** (0.109) 
-0.584* 
(0.126) CCAA11 
-0.674* 
(0.117) 
-0.574* 
(0.209) OCUL_M 
-0.077 
(0.170) 
-0.092 
(0.656) 
PARCIAL -0.996* (0.179) 
-1.049* 
(0.145) CCAA12 
-0.320* 
(0.116) 
-0.241 
(0.164) OCUL_N 
-0.131 
(0.174) 
-0.476 
(0.603) 
LOG(HORASEM) 1.197* (0.165) 
1.057* 
(0.181) CCAA14 
-0.472* 
(0.137) 
-0.326 
(0.188) OCUL_P 
-0.376 
(0.195) 
-1.485** 
(0.586) 
LOG(ANTIGAEM+1) 0.157* (0.029) 
0.221* 
(0.040) CCAA15 
0.409* 
(0.138) 
0.522* 
(0.185) OCUL_Q 
-0.099 
(0.175) 
-1.283** 
(0.559) 
TAMA2 0.223* (0.066) 
0.274* 
(0.090) CCAA16 
0.228 
(0.126) 
0.433** 
(0.175) OCUL_R 
-0.178 
(0.180) 
-1.196** 
(0.589) 
TAMA3 0.383* (0.076) 
0.130 
(0.107) CCAA17 
-0.186 
(0.152) 
0.085 
(0.177) OCUL_S 
-1.010* 
(0.193) 
-1.345** 
(0.541) 
TAMA4 0.555* (0.082) 
0.649* 
(0.103) ACTL_A 
-0.261 
(0.188) 
0.507 
(0.439) OCUL_T 
-0.552* 
(0.166) 
-1.112 
(0.571) 
PROLON1 0.181 (0.094) 
0.190 
(0.129) ACTL_B 
-0.092 
(0.548) 
2.343* 
(0.275) OCUL_U 
-0.563 
(0.319) 
-2.069* 
(0.552) 
ADECUA2 -0.493* (0.068) 
-0.327* 
(0.081) ACTL_C 
1.254* 
(0.205) 
0.759 
(0.578) 
LIMIT_2 9.529* 
(3.190) 
3.738 
(4.593) 
FORMACIO 0.198* (0.060) 
0.194** 
(0.078) ACTL_D 
0.193 
(0.144) 
0.266 
(0.198) LIMIT_3 
10.774* 
(3.208) 
4.903 
(4.605) 
NUMPARAD -0.032* (0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.014) ACTL_E 
0.273 
(0.282) 
0.733** 
(0.333) LIMIT_4 
11.767* 
(3.223) 
6.147 
(4.611) 
EDU01 -1.536* (0.297) 
-2.361* 
(0.425) ACTL_F 
0.181 
(0.152) 
0.231 
(0.296) LIMIT_5 
13.581* 
(3.234) 
7.720 
(4.619) 
EDU02 -1.279* (0.194) 
-1.400* 
(0.256) ACTL_G 
-0.161 
(0.158) 
0.072 
(0.192) LIMIT_6 
14.744* 
(3.235) 
8.913 
(4.621) 
EDU03 -1.038* (0.147) 
-1.040* 
(0.190) ACTL_H 
0.042 
(0.205) 
0.490** 
(0.203) LIMIT_7 
15.716* 
(3.235) 
10.194** 
(4.626) 
EDU04 -0.883* (0.136) 
-0.908* 
(0.159) ACTL_I 
0.041 
(0.155) 
0.185 
(0.265) LIMIT_8 
16.559* 
(3.235) 
11.284** 
(4.623) 
EDU05 -0.798* (0.148) 
-0.659* 
(0.185) ACTL_J 
0.820* 
(0.215) 
0.845* 
(0.261) LIMIT_9 
17.393* 
(3.240) 
12.515* 
(4.639) 
EDU06 -0.579* (0.139) 
-0.600* 
(0.147) ACTL_K 
-0.075 
(0.165) 
0.096 
(0.193) Pseudo-R
2 0.253 0.342 
EDU07 -0.623* (0.135) 
-0.585* 
(0.140) ACTL_M 
-0.325** 
(0.141) 
0.125 
(0.169) Log likelihood -2753.114 -1518.376 
EDU08 -0.502* (0.137) 
-0.125 
(0.126) ACTL_N 
-0.148 
(0.153) 
-0.138 
(0.148) LR statistic
a 1866.417* 
(0.000) (74 d.f.) 
1575.223* 
(0.000) (73 d.f.)
EDU10 -0.132 (0.177) 
0.082 
(0.262) ACTL_O 
0.208 
(0.240) 
-0.410 
(0.229) Number of Obs. 2221 1292 
EDU11 -0.935* (0.278) 
-0.068 
(0.464) ACTL_P 
-0.074 
(0.275) 
-0.180 
(0.235) 
LR statistica
Educations 
74.815* 
(0.000) 
57.018* 
(0.000) 
CCAA01 -0.086 (0.110) 
-0.258 
(0.171) OCUL_A 
1.099* 
(0.217) 
1.222** 
(0.594) 
LR statistica
CCAA regions 
116.287* 
(0.000) 
66.564* 
(0.000) 
CCAA02 0.083 (0.123) 
-0.187 
(0.173) OCUL_B 
1.278* 
(0.404) 
0.847 
(0.669) 
LR statistica
Activities 
81.355* 
(0.000) 
61.294* 
(0.000) 
CCAA03 -0.244** (0.116) 
-0.315 
(0.210) OCUL_C 
0.003 
(0.803) - 
LR statistica
Ocupatios 
187.962* 
(0.000) 
110.374* 
(0.000) 
CCAA04 0.433* (0.137) 
0.396** 
(0.200) OCUL_D 
0.830* 
(0.199) 
-0.023 
(0.555) 
LR statistica
SEX 
184.766* 
(0.000) 
CCAA05 -0.109 (0.137) 
0.320 
(0.173) OCUL_E 
0.818* 
(0.200) 
-0.290 
(0.549)    
CCAA06 -0.580* (0.136) 
-0.078 
(0.177) OCUL_F 
0.245 
(0.161) 
-0.718 
(0.534)    
Standard deviation into brackets; a χ2(df) Log likelihood ratio test p-value into brackets; *significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level 
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SALARIOCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
MALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
1 11 5 6 11.92 -0.92 
2 50 26 24 49.60 0.40 
3 141 31 110 142.18 -1.18 
4 779 1017 -238 771.25 7.75 
5 630 744 -114 635.57 -5.57 
6 350 266 84 353.85 -3.85 
7 159 90 69 158.35 0.65 
8 71 29 42 68.44 2.56 
9 30 13 17 29.83 0.17 
Total 2221 2221  2221  
 
 
SALARIOCAT: EXPECTATION-PREDICTION TABLE 
FEMALE 
Categories Count (Observed) 
Count of obs 
with Max Prob 
 
Error 
Sum of all 
Probabilities 
 
Error 
1 69 59 10 73.03 -4.03
2 136 96 40 127.62 8.38
3 252 218 34 254.05 -2.05
4 410 566 -156 409.22 0.78
5 227 180 47 233.25 -6.25
6 142 160 -18 140.07 1.93
7 45 12 33 43.77 1.23
8 10 1 9 10.08 -0.08
9 1 0 1 0.93 0.07
Total 1292  1292  1292  
 
 
SALARIOCAT 
Frecuencies MALE FEMALE 
Categories Real-Observed Estimated Error 
Real-
Observed Estimated Error 
1 0.50% 0.54% -0.041% 5.34% 5.65% -0.312% 
2 2.25% 2.23% 0.018% 10.53% 9.88% 0.649% 
3 6.35% 6.40% -0.053% 19.50% 19.66% -0.158% 
4 35.07% 34.73% 0.349% 31.73% 31.67% 0.061% 
5 28.37% 28.62% -0.251% 17.57% 18.05% -0.484% 
6 15.76% 15.93% -0.173% 10.99% 10.84% 0.150% 
7 7.16% 7.13% 0.029% 3.48% 3.39% 0.095% 
8 3.20% 3.08% 0.115% 0.77% 0.78% -0.006% 
9 1.35% 1.34% 0.008% 0.08% 0.07% 0.005% 
Total 100.00% 100.00%  100.00% 100.00%  
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SALARIOCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING MALE ORDERED PROBIT 
MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=1|X) 1.70% 0.54% 3.70% 
P(y=2|X) 4.13% 2.23% 7.39% 
P(y=3|X) 8.14% 6.40% 11.12% 
P(y=4|X) 34.23% 34.73% 33.39% 
P(y=5|X) 26.17% 28.62% 21.96% 
P(y=6|X) 14.80% 15.93% 12.86% 
P(y=7|X) 6.77% 7.13% 6.14% 
P(y=8|X) 2.88% 3.08% 2.55% 
P(y=9|X) 1.18% 1.34% 0.90% 
Total number Obs 3513 2221 1292 
Expectet Value [4] 4.720 4.884 4.438 
 
 
SALARIOCAT 
ESTIMATED MEAN PROBABILITIES USING FEMALE ORDERED PROBIT 
MODEL 
 Both Sexs Male Female 
P(y=1|X) 2.68% 0.96% 5.65% 
P(y=2|X) 6.16% 4.00% 9.88% 
P(y=3|X) 16.75% 15.05% 19.66% 
P(y=4|X) 35.07% 37.05% 31.67% 
P(y=5|X) 22.06% 24.39% 18.05% 
P(y=6|X) 12.25% 13.07% 10.84% 
P(y=7|X) 3.80% 4.04% 3.39% 
P(y=8|X) 1.07% 1.25% 0.78% 
P(y=9|X) 0.15% 0.19% 0.07% 
Total number Obs 3513 2221 1292 
Expectet Value [4] 4.259 4.427 3.970 
 
 
SALARIOCAT 
CATEGORIES 
1: w ≤ 270 € 
2: 270€< w ≤ 450€ 
3: 451€< w ≤601€ 
4: 601€< w ≤901€ 
5: 901€< w ≤1202€ 
6: 1202€< w ≤1652€
7: 1652€< w ≤2103€
8: 2103€< w ≤3005€
9: 3005€< w 
 
